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In 1994, Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which gives the U.S. 
Attorney General the authority to initiate structural reform litigation 
against police departments engaged in a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional misconduct.  Since then, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) has investigated and reformed dozens of police departments 
across the country.  This essay tells the story of two agencies: the Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Alamance County Sheriff’s 
Department (ACSD).  The LAPD story shows how the Department of 
Justice can use structural reform litigation to facilitate meaningful 
change in a large American police department.  By contrast, the ACSD 
demonstrates the limitations of federal intervention via § 14141.  This 
essay uses these LAPD and ACSD examples to theorize on the benefits 
and limitations of structural reform litigation as a regulatory tool.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1994, Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which gives the U.S. Attorney 
General standing to seek equitable relief against police departments engaged in a 
“pattern or practice” of unconstitutional misconduct.1  Scholars have praised the 
measure—in part, a response to the beating of Rodney King on the side of a 
Southern California highway2—as one of the most transformative tools for police 
reform.3  
                                                                                                                            
 
*   Assistant Professor, University of Alabama School of Law.  I am grateful for helpful 
comments from Donald A. Dripps, Franklin E. Zimring, Malcolm Feeley, and Calvin Morrill.  I also 
owe a debt of gratitude to the editors at the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law for their careful 
editing. 
1   42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1994) (“Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to 
believe that [a police department is engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct], the 
Attorney General, for or in the name of the United States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate 
equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.”). 
2   In the wake of the Rodney King beating, congressional hearings focused in part on the fact 
that both private litigants and the DOJ appeared to lack the necessary standing to initiate structural 
reform litigation against problematic police departments.  In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that private citizens lacked standing to seek equitable relief against a police 
department unless they could prove that the police department posed a real, immediate, and 
continuing threat to their constitutional rights.  City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).  In 
Lyons, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) had used a controversial chokehold on the 
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Over twenty years later, though, the scholarly opinion on § 14141 is mixed.  
Some have worried that the DOJ lacks the necessary resources to enforce § 14141 
effectively.4  Others have expressed concern that politics unduly influence the 
enforcement of the statute.5  Still, others have expressed concerns that the DOJ’s 
current case selection process is procedurally unfair. 6  One topic has received 
somewhat less attention from the legal academy—the on-the-ground effects of § 
14141 intervention.  Can § 14141 effectively overhaul a police department?  How 
do we measure the effectiveness of § 14141 reforms?  And what do these on-the-
ground experiences tell us about the usefulness of § 14141 as a regulatory 
mechanism?  
                                                                                                                            
plaintiff without any apparent provocation.  The plaintiff then sought to enjoin the LAPD from using 
that chokehold in the future.  Because the plaintiff could not prove a significant likelihood that he 
would be victimized by the chokehold again in the future, the Court ruled that he lacked the standing 
to force the LAPD to make this change.  Id. at 97–111.  Similarly, in United States v. City of 
Philadelphia, the Third Circuit held that, absent congressional authorization, the DOJ also lacked the 
necessary standing to initiate Structural Reform Litigation (SRL) against a police department that 
appeared to be involved in a pattern of unconstitutional misconduct.  United States v. City of 
Philadelphia, 482 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff’d, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980).  There, the DOJ 
had previously prosecuted six homicide detectives in Philadelphia for coercing confessions out of 
potentially innocent suspects.  U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON D.C., SEPT. 16–17, 1980 47–48 
(statement of Drew S. Days III, Assistant Att’y Gen., C.R. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (“The mayor 
at the time, of Philadelphia kept the officers on the force, promoted one of the men who had been 
convicted, and asserted they were innocent until proven guilty at the Supreme Court level.”).  Rather 
than punishing these officers, the City actually supported them.  Id.  The City even promoted one of 
the officers.  A subsequent DOJ investigation found that the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) 
was engaged in “a pattern of police abuse that systemically violated residents’ constitutional rights.”  
Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3205 (2014).  
But when the DOJ sought an injunction against the PPD, the federal district court dismissed and 
claimed that the U.S. Attorney had no standing to bring such a claim without congressional 
authorization.  Id.  The Third Circuit would eventually uphold the district court.  Id.  After these two 
decisions, it seemed as if litigants had few avenues to initiate court-ordered reform against police 
departments. 
3   See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 780, 798–801 (2006) (comparing its importance to the Mapp v. Ohio decision that mandated the 
exclusion of evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the Constitution).  
4   See, e.g., Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 
100–01 (2001) (arguing that the DOJ lacks the resources to address certain policing problems like 
racial profiling, and using the small number of consent decrees under § 14141 as evidence for this 
proposition); Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration 
in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 493 
(2008) (referencing previous DOJ concerns about cost-effectiveness as a reason for avoiding 
litigation in § 14141 cases); Rushin, supra note 2, at 3192, 3226 (discussing reasons for the relatively 
small number of § 14141 cases). 
5   Rushin, supra note 2, at 3228–35 (making the case that politics played some role in the 
aggressiveness of DOJ enforcement under § 14141 and the Agency’s approach to using this statute to 
bring about mandatory reforms).  
6   Id. at 3240–41 (outlining problems of case selection). 
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This essay examines the experiences of two police agencies the DOJ targeted 
for § 14141 reform: the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Alamance 
County Sheriff’s Department (ACSD).  The DOJ found that the LAPD was 
engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional misconduct in May of 2000—shortly after 
details began to emerge about the so-called Rampart Scandal.7  Thereafter, the 
LAPD underwent a nearly twelve-year reform process.8  This essay uses a range of 
quantitative measures to judge the effect of the federal oversight of the LAPD.  It 
finds that the LAPD made significant progress in reducing officer misconduct in 
the years after federal intervention.  
In contrast, the DOJ has been unable to stimulate change in Alamance 
County.  After a lengthy federal investigation found that the ACSD was engaged in 
systemic misconduct, Alamance County Sheriff, Terry Johnson, resisted DOJ 
reform efforts.9  The DOJ eventually brought the ACSD to trial—the first § 14141 
trial in history—and lost.10  These two examples vividly demonstrate the potential 
and the limitations of § 14141 as a regulatory mechanism.  While the DOJ 
effectively used § 14141 to stimulate reform in one of the nation’s largest police 
departments in Los Angeles, it ultimately failed to bring about more change in a 
smaller county sheriff’s department.  These competing case studies suggest that 
organizational buy-in may be critical to effective § 14141 reform.  This is a 
potentially problematic realization.  It remains unclear whether such an approach 
will bring about lasting reform in communities that vehemently oppose federal 
intervention.11 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
7   The investigation started on July 31, 1996.  Id. at 3244 (showing in app. A the dates that the 
DOJ opened all investigations into local police affairs under § 14141 from the beginning of the 
statute’s passage through 2013).  The Justice Department found there to be an officially pattern or 
practice of misconduct on May 8, 2000.  OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR OF THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, 
FINAL REPORT, app. F, at 3 (June 11, 2009) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD]. 
8   Rushin, supra note 2, at 3247 (showing that the DOJ’s intervention in L.A. lasted from 
June 15, 2001 until May 16, 2013—or just shy of twelve calendar years).  
9   See infra Part II. 
10  Id.  
11  This is particularly problematic since President Barack Obama’s administration has 
pledged to engage in hostile takeovers of police departments engaged in patterns of unconstitutional 
misconduct.  Further, it is possible that the next president—particularly if it is a Democrat—may 
continue this enforcement approach.  Heather Mac Donald, Targeting the Police, WKLY. STAND. (Jan. 
31, 2011), http://www.weeklystandard.com/targeting-the-police/article/536863 (citing a statement 
made by then-Assistant Att’y Gen. Thomas Perez, who “told a conference of police chiefs . . . that the 
Justice Department would be pursuing ‘pattern or practice’ takeovers of police departments much 
more aggressively than [it did under] the Bush Administration, eschewing negotiation in favor of 
hardball tactics seeking immediate federal control”). 
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II. LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 
 
Less than a decade after the Rodney King incident spurred the passage of § 
14141, the LAPD found itself embroiled in yet another, perhaps even more 
egregious scandal—the Rampart Scandal.  Professor Erwin Chemerinsky described 
the Rampart Scandal as the “worst . . . in the history of Los Angeles.”12  The 
scandal involved police physically abusing suspects, committing violent and 
serious crimes, planting evidence, and ultimately framing innocent people. 13  
Because of officer misconduct, a number of innocent men and women pled guilty 
to crimes they did not commit and were successfully convicted based on 
“fabricated cases against them.”14  The scandal eventually implicated dozens of 
LAPD officers for various types of misconduct, resulting in the overturning of 
approximately 100 cases, and the review of around 3,000 more.15  Soon after the 
Rampart Scandal made news, the DOJ concluded that the LAPD was engaged in a 
“pattern or practice” of unconstitutional misconduct, in violation of § 14141.16  
As part of its settlement with the DOJ, the LAPD agreed to adopt new 
procedures for investigating use of force incidents, 17  new search and arrest 
procedures,18 improved citizen complaint procedures,19 policies on investigation 
conduct, 20  and protocols for disciplining officers. 21   For example, the consent 
decree mandated the creation of a unit dedicated to the investigation of use of force 
                                                                                                                            
 
12  Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department’s 
Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 549 (2001).  
13  The scandal came to light in part because of confessions made by former LAPD officer 
Rafael Perez, who worked in the Rampart Division.  After the LAPD tied Perez to missing drugs 
from a property storage area, Perez confessed to a range of serious misconduct.  He also implicated a 
number of other officers in egregious wrongdoing.  See generally Bernard C. Parks, L.A. POLICE 
DEP’T, BD. OF INQUIRY INTO THE RAMPART AREA CORRUPTION INCIDENT: PUBLIC REPORT (Mar. 1, 
2000). 
14  Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rampart Scandal and the Criminal Justice System in Los Angeles 
County, 57 GUILD PRACT. 121, 121 (2000). 
15  Beth Shuster & Vincent J. Schodolski, Poor Morale Rife in LAPD, Survey Finds, L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/sep/08/news/mn-17580.  
16  Letter from Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., C.R. Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to James K. Hahn, City Attorney, City of L.A. (May 8, 2000) [hereinafter Letter from DOJ to 
LA], https://www.justice.gov/crt/lapd-notice-investigation-letter. 
17  Consent Decree, United States v. City of Los Angeles, 2:00-cv-11769-GAF-RC, at 23–27 
(C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001) [hereinafter Los Angeles Consent Decree], 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0002-0006.pdf (laying out the terms of the use 
of force stipulations).  
18  Id. at 27–29.  
19  Id. at 29–32.  
20  Id. at 32–34.  
21  Id. at 35–37.  
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incidents housed in the Operations Headquarters Bureau.22  It mandated a specific 
investigative procedure for use of force incidents.23  And it required the LAPD to 
adopt specific mechanisms for the intake, investigation, and adjudication of citizen 
complaints.24 
Like many consent decrees, the Los Angeles agreement also required the 
agency to implement an early intervention system (EIS) designed to minimize the 
risk of problematic police behavior.25  It also established important changes to the 
way that the LAPD trained officers,26 added components to the existing training 
program that notified officers of their ability to report misconduct,27 and mandated 
additional training in cultural diversity, Fourth Amendment law, ethics, and 
more.28  The decree also created another oversight mechanism in the Audit Unit.29  
The purpose of this new Audit Unit was to regularly examine LAPD records to 
ensure that officers were substantively complying with written mandates. 30  
                                                                                                                            
 
22  Id. at 23, ¶ 55.  
23  Id. at 23–24, ¶¶ 56–58. 
24  Id. at 32–38 (detailing rules on the initiation, investigation, and adjudication of complaints). 
25  Id. at 9–21 (describing the development of the TEAMS II system, the management and 
coordination of risk assessment responsibilities, and the performance evaluation system).  This new 
system, described as TEAMS II in the consent decree, was designed as an improvement of the 
existing TEAMS system that the LAPD already used.  Id. at 9 (“The City has taken steps to develop, 
and shall establish a database containing relevant information about its officers, supervisors, and 
managers to promote professionalism and best policing practices and to identify and modify at-risk 
behavior . . . . This system shall be a successor to, and not simply a modification of, the existing 
computerized information processing system known as the Training Evaluation and Management 
System (‘TEAMS’).”).  Another important requirement of the consent decree was that the Police 
Commission, the Inspector General, and the Chief of Police were all required to have equal and 
complete access to the new TEAMS II system.  Id.  This was designed to ensure that all oversight 
bodies in the LAPD would have the chance to engage in meaningful oversight.  Id.  The consent 
decree clearly labeled all of the types of information that were to be included in the TEAMS II 
system, including documentation on every time an officer uses force, engages in vehicle pursuits, 
receives a commendation, conducts an arrest, receives mandated training, is the subject of a civil 
lawsuit, is the subject of disciplinary action, or is the subject of a complaint.  It is worth noting that 
this is not an exhaustive list of all information required to be included in the new TEAMS II system.  
For a complete list, see id. at 9–11.  The decree also laid out specifics on how the department ought to 
review and audit data from the TEAMS II system on a regular basis.  Id. at 14–17.  
26  Id. at 54–58.   
27  Id. at 57.  
28  Id. at 56–58.  These mandated additional trainings included training in the protections 
available to officers that fear retaliation for reporting misconduct.  Id. at 57.  
29  Id. at 59 (“The Department shall create and continue to have an audit unit within the office 
of the Chief of Police (the ‘Audit Unit’) with centralized responsibility for developing the Annual 
Audit Plan, coordinating and scheduling audits contemplated by the Annual Audit Plan and ensuring 
timely completion of audits, and conducting audits as directed by the Chief of Police.”). 
30  The consent decree specifically required the use of stratified random samples of 
departmental records to ensure compliance with policy requirements, as well as sting audits, where 
undercover agents investigate agency compliance covertly.  Id. at 61 (describing the need for these 
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Further, the consent decree included portions regulating the management of gang 
units,31 the development of programs to respond to persons with disabilities,32 and 
community outreach.33  Similar to all federal intervention, the consent decree made 
it clear that the City of Los Angeles was responsible for the cost of this monitor 
and the cost of all necessary reform measures.34  
In the early years of federal intervention in Los Angeles, the external 
monitoring team assigned to oversee the LAPD expressed concern over some 
failures by the LAPD to meet the standards of the consent decree.  For example, 
only months after Federal District Judge Gary Feess officially named Michael 
Cherkasky as the monitor, his monitoring team found that the LAPD had an 
unacceptable backlog of misconduct cases and citizen complaints in violation of 
the consent decree.35  
To address the public concerns surrounding the consent decree, early on in the 
federal intervention process, the LAPD made a change in leadership by appointing 
William Bratton as police chief. 36   According to the monitor reports, the 
appointment of Chief Bratton marked the true beginning of institutional reform in 
the LAPD, in part because “Chief Bratton raised the level of visibility and 
dedication to the [consent] [d]ecree. . .”37  One of Bratton’s most visible moves 
that demonstrated his dedication to the consent decree was his appointment of 
Gerald Chaleff as head of the Consent Decree Bureau.  Bratton gave Chaleff, a 
                                                                                                                            
two types of audits, each under somewhat different conditions).  Specifically, the consent decree 
required the LAPD to audit arrests records, motor vehicle stop records, use of force investigations, 
community complaint investigation records, warrant applications, confidential informant files, and 
other LAPD work product.  Id. at 60–62 (listing these and other audit requirements).  To address the 
problems that emerged in the Rampart scandal, the consent decree also required audits of financial 
disclosures made by all LAPD officers who routinely handle valuable contraband or cash.  Id. at 63.  
While the Audit Unit was tasked with the responsibility of conducting these audits, the consent 
decree also required the Audit Unit to turn over their results to the Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) for evaluation.  The results of these OIG investigations of the Audit Division results must be 
forwarded to the Police Commission for further review.  This decentralization of responsibility 
ensures that no one group has complete control over LAPD accountability; responsibility is diffused 
throughout the organization.  Id. at 65. 
31  Id. at 47–50.  
32  Id. at 54–55.  
33  Id. at 72–73.  Further, the consent decree required the DOJ and the LAPD to negotiate in 
good faith on the selection of an external monitoring team to oversee the implementation of 
settlement terms.  Id. at 74 (further explaining that the monitor was to be selected by March 1, 2001 
and ought to meet certain specified requirements).  The monitor was supposed to cost no more than 
$10 million over the first 5 years in total fees, not counting the cost of “out-of-pocket costs for travel 
and incidentals.”  Id.   
34  Id. at 75 (“The City shall bear all reasonable fees and costs of the Monitor.”).  
35  Rick Orlov, LAPD Reforms Stymied by Backlog Jam, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Nov. 20, 2001, 
at N4.  
36  FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 7, at 5 (Before becoming chief, Bratton was serving 
as a policing expert on the Kroll monitoring team overseeing the LAPD.)  
37  Id.  
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criminal defense attorney and former member of the Board of Police 
Commissioners, a position within the LAPD roughly equivalent to a Deputy 
Chief.38  Elevating such a figure like Chaleff—someone from outside the LAPD 
who had spent much of his professional career critical of police behavior—sent a 
signal that the LAPD under Bratton was prepared to undergo significant changes if 
necessary to meet the terms of the decree.39  When Chief Bratton faced opposition 
from his own officers over the terms of the consent decree—and there was 
plenty—he adamantly stood his ground and defended the consent decree’s 
provisions as mere best practices.40  
Despite the existence of supportive leadership atop the LAPD, the entire 
implementation process took nearly twelve years to complete. 41   The federal 
government spent more time overseeing the LAPD than virtually any other 
agency.42  However, once the reforms had concluded, the LAPD was a remarkably 
different agency by virtually any metric.  The parts that follow walk through many 
of these important measures, showing the progress that the LAPD made under the 
federal monitor’s watchful eye.  
 
A. Evidence of Reform  
 
Before discussing the evidence of reform in Los Angeles, it is important to 
fully acknowledge the limitations of the available data.  Ideally, any test of the Los 
Angeles consent decree would examine the effects of federal intervention on rates 
of police misconduct.  Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted way to 
measure the prevalence of police misconduct.  Police misconduct is varied.  In a 
perfect world, the number of civil rights complaints filed against a police 
department would roughly approximate the amount of misconduct present in that 
agency.  Unfortunately, the flawed complaint procedures were one of the key 
reasons for federal intervention in the LAPD in the first place; it would not be 
surprising to see the total number of complaints against the LAPD rise during 
                                                                                                                            
 
38  Id. 
39  Id.  
40  Id.  In § 14141 actions, the district judge typically plays a minor role.  This case was no 
exception.  In their report, the monitors described the role played by each party in the process.  The 
sections describing the role of the monitoring team, DOJ, and LAPD included detailed descriptions of 
the ways that each party advanced the reform process.  The section on the role of the federal district 
court included a mere single sentence reading: “The Honorable Gary Feess of the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California has presided over this matter for the entire time it 
has been pending.”  Id. at 6.  
41  “The Los Angeles monitoring lasted from June 15, 2001, to May 16, 2013—approximately 
4353 days or 11.9 years.”  Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police 
Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1392 n.269 (2015).  
42  This is not surprising, though, given the complexity of the agreement, the size of the 
department, and depth of the problems facing the agency before intervention. 
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federal intervention.  This rise may not be because LAPD officers are engaged in 
more misconduct.  Instead, this rise could very well suggest that citizens finally 
have an easy avenue to file their grievances against police officers.  Thus, the 
subsections that follow will walk through a range of alternative methods to test the 
effectiveness of federal intervention in Los Angeles.  
 
1. Citizen Opinions of the LAPD 
 
One way to evaluate the impact of the federal consent decree is to see whether 
public opinion of the LAPD shifted over this time period.  Surveys of Los Angeles 
residents conducted by previous researchers around the time of federal intervention 
give some insight into shifts in public opinion.  In 2005, a few years into federal 
intervention, less than fifty percent of residents surveyed said that the “services of 
the police” were “good” or “excellent” policing services.43  Near the end of federal 
intervention in 2009, this number increased to around 60 percent.44  The proportion 
of Los Angeles residents that believed the LAPD was doing a “good” or 
“excellent” job overall also increased during the time of federal intervention.  
Figure 1 illustrates this trend.  
 
Figure 1. Resident Assessment of LAPD Policing Services 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
43  CHRISTOPHER STONE, TODD FOGLESONG & CHRISTINE M COLE, POLICING LOS ANGELES 
UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD 44 (2009), 
http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf (showing these statistics in 
Figure 29). 
44  Id.  
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By 2009, across all racial groups, Los Angeles residents reported high 
satisfaction with the overall job done by the LAPD.45  It is worth noting, though, 
that Black residents still reported somewhat less satisfaction with the LAPD than 
White, Latino, and Asian residents. 46   Another survey asked respondents: 
“Compared with the LAPD three years ago, do you believe the police department 
in Los Angeles today is more likely, less likely, or equally likely to bring offenders 
to justice while respecting their rights and complying with the law?”47  A strong 
majority of Black, White, Latino, and Asian respondents answered either “equally 
likely” or “more likely,”48 and over eighty percent of Black, White, Latino, and 
Asian respondents reported being somewhat or very hopeful about the direction of 
the LAPD in 2009.49  
Perhaps most interestingly, in interviews with detainees—those taken into 
custody by the LAPD—the majority reported that the LAPD was doing a “good” 
or “excellent” job.50  All of this data suggests that the LAPD may have made some 
meaningful progress over the federal intervention term.  This data is also similar to 
the experience of other cities that underwent federal intervention.  In Pittsburgh, 
for example, a survey of 400 residents found that a significant number reported 
visible improvements in policing services and fair treatment.51  
In Los Angeles, some troubling patterns remain in the survey data.  For 
instance, some surveys in Los Angeles showed significant racial divides.  When 
residents were asked whether the LAPD “treat all racial and ethnic groups fairly,” 
a strong majority of white respondents answered “almost always” or “most of the 
time.”52  By contrast, only around half of Latino and around 40 percent of Black 
respondents expressed similar optimism. 53   Similar disparities existed when 
interviewers asked Los Angeles residents: “Based on your personal experiences, 
how many of the LAPD officers you encounter treat you, your friends, and your 
family members with respect?” and “How would you describe relations between 
the LAPD and the community where you live?”54  It is worth noting that Los 
                                                                                                                            
 
45  Id. at 45 (showing in Figure 30 that Hispanic, White, Black, Asian, and other racial groups 
all showed a strong majority assessing the LAPD as either “good” or “excellent”).  
46  Id.  
47  Id. at 46 (displaying these statistics in Figure 31).  
48  Id.  
49  Id. (providing this data in Figure 32).  
50  Id. at 48.  
51  See generally ROBERT C. DAVIS, CHRISTOPHER W. ORTIZ, NICOLE J. HENDERSON, JOEL 
MILLER & MICHELLE K. MASSIE, VERA INST. OF JUST., TURNING NECESSITY INTO VIRTUE: 
PITTSBURGH’S EXPERIENCE WITH A FEDERAL CONSENT DECREE (2002), 
http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Pittsburgh_consent_decree.pdf. 
52  STONE ET AL., supra note 43, at 50.  
53  Id.  
54  Id. at 51–53.  
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Angeles is not alone in witnessing an apparent disparity in citizen satisfaction 
based on race.  The same basic pattern emerged in the surveys done in Pittsburgh 
after federal intervention.55  
Of course, citizen survey responses are hardly dispositive.  It is often unclear 
how familiar any given respondent is with the changes made during a consent 
decree.  And an individual citizen is not necessarily well positioned to judge 
changes in the frequency of police misconduct.  But overall, these surveys in Los 
Angeles should inspire tempered optimism.  Some racial disparities aside, these 
results are consistent with a police department that may have made observable 
improvements during federal intervention.  
 
2. TEAMS II 
 
Remember that one of important components of the LAPD consent decree 
was the development of a new early information system (EIS)56 called TEAMS II 
to keep track of “risk-oriented data (uses of force, complaints, etc.) [and] 
operational data (arrests, traffic stops, citations, etc.)” and “automatically notify 
supervisory personnel when officers in their command deviate significantly from 
the norms of their sworn peers.”57  The monitoring team found that the LAPD not 
only developed a satisfactory EIS in TEAMS II, but that the department 
“incorporated [it] into the LAPD Manual and in the daily business practices . . . 
including promotions, pay-grade advancement, selections to specialized units[,] . . . 
annual performance evaluations, transfers to new commands, . . . and complaint 
investigations.”58  The monitoring team audited dozens of monthly reports created 
by this new data system, and found the department was generally using this new 
data system properly.59  An event in 2008 illustrates just how useful these kinds of 
data-driven warning systems can be in improving the constitutionality of local 
policing.  The LAPD in coordination with the monitoring team conducted an 
assessment of data collected by the new data system and found that the Central 
                                                                                                                            
 
55  DAVIS ET AL., supra note 51, at 39.  
56  This EIS involved five separate systems that were integrated together: “the Complaint 
Management System (CMS), the Use of Force System (UOFS), the STOP database, the Risk 
Management Information System (RMIS) and the Deployment Planning System (DPS).”  FINAL 
REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 7, at 10.  
57  Id. at 9.  
58  Id.  
59  Id. at 11–12 (“[T]he Monitor reviewed 34 different monthly reports produced by RMIS, 
including four individual summary and comparison reports, 15 different summary and comparison 
reports for units and/or workgroups and 15 different incident reports. . . . [and] determined that these 
reports met the Consent Decree requirement . . . .”).  
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Area Narcotics unit appeared to engage in statistically unusual behavior.60  The 
unit was disproportionately taking advantage of a narrow exception in LAPD 
policy that permitted officers to avoid completing a field data report after stopping 
a suspect.61  Thanks to the data-driven system mandated via federal intervention, 
the LAPD was able to notice this potentially unconstitutional pattern of behavior 
and take actions to correct it preemptively. 
 
3. Use of Force 
 
According to the external monitoring team, the LAPD’s improved use of 
force policies and procedures were “the single most encouraging aspect” of the 
federal intervention era.62  The DOJ had identified a pervasive pattern of unlawful 
use of force present in the LAPD at the time of the federal investigation.  Starting 
in August of 2002, the monitoring team began documenting various measures to 
test whether the LAPD was using force in a constitutional manner.  First, the 
LAPD made dramatic improvements in properly reporting use of force incidents to 
superiors.63  Second, the consent decree mandated that the Use of Force Review 
Board review all so-called categorical use of force incidents.64  Categorical use of 
force refers to any lethal force used by law enforcement or any force resulting in 
injury requiring hospitalization, all head strikes, and deaths in custody.65  The 
                                                                                                                            
 
60  Id. at 13 (explaining how, after a staff review of “total Department-wide action items for 
the second quarter of 2008,” the LAPD determined that the Central Area Narcotics unit “appeared to 
be statistically higher than the average of other specialized units for RMIS thresholds”).  
61  Id.  The monitors also observed that supervisors appeared to be engaged directly in use of 
force incidents rather than serving in a merely supervisory capacity.  Id.  
62  Id. at 20.  
63  OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR OF THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT FOR THE QUARTER 
ENDING JUNE 30, 2002 6–7 (June 30, 2002) [hereinafter FOURTH QUARTERLY REPORT FOR LAPD], 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0002-0015.pdf (stating “[n]otification and a 
prompt response by CIID is critical to preserve evidence and maintain integrity”).  The Fourth 
Quarterly Report stated that, “[t]he CIID’s overall response time ranged from approximately 25 to 
106 minutes, with an average mean arrival time of 69 minutes.  This response time is judged to be 
within acceptable limits and not an impairment to the investigation.”  Id. at 6.  The report also stated 
that the police chief was properly notified in twenty-two out of twenty-three cases, or 95.7% of the 
time.  Id. at 7; FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 7, app. D, at 2 (showing paragraph 58 in 
compliance throughout the period of the consent decree). 
64  OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR OF THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT FOR THE QUARTER 
ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2002 20 (Nov. 15, 2002) [hereinafter FIFTH QUARTERLY REPORT FOR LAPD], 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0002-0016.pdf (“Paragraph 69 requires the 
LAPD to continue its practice of presenting every Categorical Use of Force investigation before the 
Use of Force Review Board.”). 
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monitors observed the process by which the Use of Force Review Board hears 
cases of categorical use of force and found them to be in line with the requirements 
in the consent decree. 66   The LAPD continued these full board reviews for 
categorical use of force throughout the period of the consent decree.67  
Similarly, the consent decree required the LAPD to review non-categorical 
use of force incidents within 14 calendar days.68  The LAPD initially had a tough 
time abiding by this requirement.  When the monitoring team first audited use of 
force files in December of 2002 to determine whether non-categorical use of force 
incidents were being properly investigated within the requisite 14 days, the team 
found that only 75% of cases were evaluated in the proper time frame.69  This was 
deemed insufficient.70  By June of 2003, the LAPD had dramatically improved this 
figure.  By then, the LAPD processed approximately 94% of non-categorical use of 
force cases within 14 days.71  This figure increased to 95.6% in December of 2003 
and remained above 95% thereafter.72  
                                                                                                                            
65  L.A. POLICE DEP’T, USE OF FORCE ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2009) [hereinafter USE OF FORCE 
REPORT FOR LAPD 2009], http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/2009YearEndReportFinal.pdf.  The 
LAPD’s full definition of categorical use of force is as follows:  
All incidents involving the use of lethal force such as intentional Officer Involved 
Shootings; Unintended Discharges of a firearm; all uses of Carotid Restraint Control 
Holds; all uses of force resulting in an injury requiring hospitalization, commonly 
referred to as Law Enforcement Related Injuries; all Head strikes with an impact weapon; 
all other uses of force resulting in  death; all deaths while the arrestee or detainee is in the 
custodial care of the LAPD referred to as an In-Custody Death; or a K-9 Contact which 
result in hospitalization. 
Id. 
66  FIFTH QUARTERLY REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 64, at 20–21. 
67  FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 7, app. D, at 2 (showing under paragraph 69(a) that 
the LAPD was in compliance with this portion in the Fifth Quarterly Report and remained in 
compliance over the duration of the consent decree).  
68  OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR OF THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT FOR THE QUARTER 
ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2002 18 (Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter SIXTH QUARTERLY REPORT FOR LAPD], 
http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/6th_quarterly_report_03_02_15.pdf (explaining that the 
consent decree requires “LAPD Division . . . to review each use of force within 14 calendar days of 
the incident, unless a deficiency in the investigation is detected, in which case the review shall be 
completed within a reasonable time period”). 
69  Id. at 19 (“The Monitor found that 21 of the 85 investigations selected for review were not 
reviewed within 14 calendar days of their submission.  For all 21 incident investigations the Monitor 
noted no extenuating circumstances and the LAPD did not document any extenuating circumstances 
that would have precluded the investigation from reasonably being reviewed as required.”).  
70  Id.  
71  OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR OF THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT FOR THE QUARTER 
ENDING JUNE 30, 2003 18 (Aug. 15, 2003) [hereinafter EIGHTH QUARTERLY REPORT FOR LAPD], 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0002-0024.pdf (“During the current quarter, the 
Monitor reviewed the merits of 87 NCUOF incident investigations . . . [and in] all but five 
investigations, LAPD Division Management reviewed the incident within 14 days and the 
investigations were completed within a reasonable time period thereafter.”).  
72  OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR OF THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT FOR THE QUARTER 
ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2003 23–24 (Feb. 17, 2004) [hereinafter TENTH QUARTERLY REPORT FOR 
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Third, another part of the consent decree required the LAPD to utilize specific 
procedures in investigating both categorical and non-categorical use of force 
claims.  For example, the consent decree required the audio and video recording of 
interviews conducted after categorical use of force incidents.73  It barred the use of 
group interviews after both categorical and non-categorical use of force events.74  
It also established requirements for the collection and preservation of evidence and 
mandated officer interviews with all supervisors after use of force incidents, 
among other requirements.75  The monitoring team first measured compliance with 
these requirements in September of 2002.  In this initial examination, the monitors 
examined 37 categorical force investigations.76  While this initial assessment found 
the LAPD in compliance with most of the categorical force investigation 
requirements, it did find that the LAPD had failed to adequately tape or video 
record interviews,77 and failed to collect and preserve adequate evidence.78  The 
monitors similarly found the non-categorical investigations to be insufficient in 
multiple ways during the first examination.79  Soon, though, the LAPD corrected 
these problems and generally maintained compliant use-of-force investigation 
procedures from that point forward.80 
Combined, these various measures suggest that the LAPD’s reporting and 
investigation of use-of-force improved substantially during the consent decree 
period.  What is surprisingly absent, though, from the monitoring report is some 
measure of how these changes impacted the LAPD’s proclivity towards using 
force against criminal suspects.  The Office of Inspector General (OIG), though, 
does provide some consistent measure of use of force over time.  During the time 
that the monitors were regularly overseeing the categorical use of force report 
procedures, the total number of categorical use of force incidents declined 
                                                                                                                            
LAPD], http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0002-0026.pdf (stating that eighty-
seven out of ninety-one cases of non-categorical use of force were properly handled within fourteen 
days).   
73  FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 7, app. D, at 3 (describing the conduct of 
investigation requirements in paragraphs 80i and 81i for categorical and non-categorical uses of force 
incidents).  
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76  FIFTH QUARTERLY REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 64, at 37.  
77  Id. at 38 (“For the 37 incidents reviewed, two contained witness statements that were not 
captured on tape and one contained a suspect’s statement that was not captured on tape.”).  
78  Id. (“In two separate Categorical Use of Force incidents the Monitor identified a key 
witness to the incident who was not interviewed by the investigating officers.”).  
79  FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 7, app. D, at 3 (noting that the LAPD was not in 
compliance in the first audit of the non-categorical investigation procedures in the Sixth Quarterly 
Report for paragraph 81i). 
80  Id. (showing a move from non-compliance to compliance for various categories listed 
under paragraphs 80i and 81i for categorical and non-categorical uses of force investigations).  
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noticeably.  Figure 2 below shows the decline in categorical use of force incidents 
during the monitoring period.  
 
Figure 2. Categorical Uses of Force per Officer by LAPD 
 
 
The notable decrease in categorical use of force incidents during the 
monitoring time period may be a mere coincidence.  It may be a side effect of 
decreased crime.  Or it may represent a genuine change in officer behavior to use 
categorical force less often, since officers are aware that the OIG and the external 
monitor are observing their behavior.  It is tough to make any definitive 
conclusions from the data, although the general trend is encouraging.81  
 
4. Bias-Free Policing 
 
One controversial subject during the federal intervention era was the LAPD’s 
adherence to the consent decree’s mandated non-discrimination policy for 
automobile and pedestrian stops.  The Christopher Commission, convened after the 
Rodney King incident, found significant evidence of racial bias in the LAPD’s 
ranks, and investigations after the Rampart Scandal revealed similar problems.82  
                                                                                                                            
 
81  It is important to note that two years after the external monitoring team stopped monitoring 
categorical uses of force, the total number of categorical use of force incidents increased by about 
37%.  ALEXANDER A. BUSTAMANTE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., QUARTERLY USE OF FORCE 
REPORT: FIRST QUARTER 2012 2 (June 27, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 USE OF FORCE REPORT], 
http://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/070312/BPC_12-0284.pdf.  I reached the 37% statistic by 
comparing the 2009 number of categorical use of force incidents with the 2011 number (84 and 115 
respectively).  Most of this uptick was tied back to an increase in officer-involved shootings, which 
increased by 58% in just one year.  Id.  The LAPD has not publicly provided any thorough 
explanation for this sudden jump in officer-involved shootings.  This is a potentially discouraging 
development. 
82  FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 7, at 69.  
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To measure the presence of possible racial profiling, the LAPD began collecting 
demographic statistics on vehicle and pedestrian stops starting in November of 
2001.83  The Audit Unit then began auditing this data in August of 2003.84  By 
2005, Los Angeles released a major public report detailing the results of these 
audits. 85   It found that, even when controlling for several variables, racial 
disparities remained.86  A few years later, Professor Ian Ayres worked with the 
ACLU of Southern California to conduct an additional study of this same data 
set.87  Ayres found apparent racial bias in how LAPD officers exercised authority 
post-stop.88  In response to these reports, the LAPD leadership instituted additional 
protocols that required officers to fully articulate detailed reasons for conducting 
traffic and pedestrian stops.89  Complaints against officers for racial profiling were 
not closed unless the officer had provided such a full explanation.90  
The LAPD made several other attempts to correct this problem.  First, the 
LAPD put in place an automated reporting system that automatically recorded stop 
data into the TEAMS II system.91  This way, even if it was difficult to reach 
conclusions on the presence of racial bias via aggregate statistics, the LAPD hoped 
to identify individual officers that may be engaged in a more visible pattern of 
race-based stops.  Second, the LAPD began installing cameras in squad cars.92  
The LAPD has also agreed to conduct regularized audits of audio and video from 
these cameras.93  Thus, while some claims of racial bias remain in the LAPD, it 
appears that the department has taken substantial steps to correct these problems.  
                                                                                                                            
 
83  Id. at 70 (“The Decree also mandated that the Department require LAPD officers to 
complete a written or electronic report each time an officer conducts a motor vehicle or pedestrian 
stop by November 1, 2001.”).  
84  Id. at 71 (“[The Audit Unit] completed its first Motor Vehicle and Pedestrian Stop Data 
Collection Audit in August 2003.”).  
85  Id. at 72 (“The City, working through the Analysis Group, Inc. prepared and released the 
‘Final Pedestrian and Motor Vehicle Stop Data Analyses Methodology Report,’ dated December 8, 
2005.” (citation omitted)). 
86  Id.  
87  IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE 
LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (2008), https://www.aclusocal.org/issues/police-
practices/racial-profiling-the-lapd-a-study-of-racially-disparate-outcomes-in-the-los-angeles-police-
department/. 
88  See id. at i.  
89  FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 7, at 74.  
90  Id.  
91  Id. (“This system incorporates the collection of stop data as approved by DOJ and provides 
for its storage in TEAMS II.”).  
92  Id. (“[T]he City and Department have continued to move toward Department-wide 
implementation of cameras in cars (DICVS), which the Monitor has strongly endorsed and 
recommended as a best practice in monitoring potential bias in stops.”). 
93  Id. at 75 (stating that the LAPD planned to “[c]onduct regular audits of the audio and video, 
in addition to periodic inspections by supervisors.”). 
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5. Auditing 
 
Perhaps the single most transformative change made in the LAPD was the 
structural change in monitoring police behavior via auditing.  Before, the LAPD 
had some mechanisms in place to monitor police behavior—namely, an Office of 
the Inspector General.94  However, in the years before federal intervention, these 
two oversight mechanisms lacked the authority and skills to properly oversee 
LAPD behavior.95  Thus, as part of the consent decree, the federal government 
demanded that the LAPD create a new Audit Unit.96  This new Audit Unit was 
given the responsibility of conducting stratified, randomized audits of various 
police practices.97  Under the consent decree, the Chief of Police was to submit to 
the Police Commission and the OIG a list of planned audit targets.98  The Audit 
Unit was then responsible for conducting these regular audits and submitting the 
results to the Police Commission and OIG for review. 99   The consent decree 
mandated several required subjects of these regular audits: warrants, arrests, use of 
force, stops, complaints, financial disclosures, and police training.  
During the federal intervention era, the external monitoring team examined 
the quality of the audits conducted by the Audit Unit.  At first, these audits were 
frequently flawed.  For example, the monitoring team found that many of these 
early audits “used inadequate samples and included questions that yielded 
imprecise results.”100  Over time, and with the help of both the external monitors 
and additional newly hired personnel, the LAPD dramatically improved the quality 
of these regular audits.  After only a few years, the Audit Unit began submitting 
timely audits that met quantitative and qualitative expectations.101  Figure 3 shows 
the progress that the Audit Unit made in just four short years.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
94  In the wake of the Rodney King beating, Los Angeles established an Inspector General 
responsible for overseeing “receipt of citizen complaints, monitoring the progress of complaints 
through the Internal Affairs investigation process, and auditing the results of those investigations.”  
MERRICK J. BOBB, MARK H. EPSTEIN, NICOLAS H. MILLER & MANUEL A. ABASCAL, FIVE YEARS 
LATER: A REPORT TO THE LOS ANGELES POLICE COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE 
DEPARTMENT’S IMPLEMENTATION OF INDEPENDENT COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 69 (May 1996) 
[hereinafter FIVE YEARS LATER REPORT ON LAPD], http://www.morongobasinombudsman.com/files-
for-download/five-years-later---christop.pdf. 
95  Letter from DOJ to LA, supra note 16. 
96  See supra text accompanying note 29. 
97  Id.  
98  Id.  
99  Id.  
100 FINAL REPORT FOR LAPD, supra note 7, at 109.  
101  Id. at 110.  
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Figure 3. Number of Required and Sufficient Audits Conducted by Audit Unit 
 
 
 
This is not to say that the Audit Unit has been perfect.  In fact, in the later 
years of monitoring, the Audit Unit still had some issues with timeliness, as seen 
by the slight dip in compliance between 2005 and 2007.  The LAPD, an agency 
that once suffered from serious deficiencies in monitoring their own officers, has 
made tremendous improvement in this regard over the federal intervention era—so 
much improvement that the agency “[p]articipat[ed] as founding members of the 
International Law Enforcement Auditor’s Association (ILEAA) and coordinat[ed] 
the first ILEAA conference in August 2007.”102  The LAPD Audit Unit has even 
participated in peer reviews of other similar systems that have been installed in 
cities like Phoenix, Dallas, and Richmond.103   
 
6. Additional Measures 
 
The monitoring team also found that the LAPD made substantial progress in 
improving its management of gang units, 104  handling of persons with mental 
illnesses, 105  policies on confidential informants, 106  and broader training 
programs. 107   Monitors also audited warrant applications and arrest records to 
                                                                                                                            
 
102 Id. at 112.  
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 76–83 (stating that although the LAPD struggled with the gang unit requirements 
early on, the “Department has made substantial strides toward a better trained and supervised gang 
unit . . . .”).  
105 Id. at 89–93 (claiming that the LAPD has made “significant advances” in this area and now 
“continues to be in the national forefront of this important policing issue”).  
106 Id. at 84–88 (“The Department released a Confidential Informant Manual in 2002 that 
incorporated all of the requirements of the Consent Decree.”).  
107 Id. at 93–99 (“The LAPD has been tremendously successful in its effort to improve its 
training function.”). 
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verify legal sufficiency and authenticity of officer behavior.108  The monitors found 
that the LAPD made substantial progress in both areas.109 
 
B. Costs of Reform 
 
Federal intervention appears to have been successful in reducing misconduct 
in Los Angeles—but at what cost?  What did the City of Los Angeles have to 
sacrifice to make this apparent improvement in its police force?  Surprisingly, it 
appears that Los Angeles made little sacrifice to achieve these improvements in 
constitutional policing.  Although the City of Los Angeles spent a considerable 
amount of money to pay for initial investments into misconduct reforms, there is 
reason to believe that the city has been able to recoup many of these costs through 
reductions in police misconduct.  Police officers also worried that the consent 
decree may result in de-policing—that is, a reduction in police aggressiveness, 
resulting in an increase in crime.  In actuality, though, little statistical evidence 
exists to verify this so-called de-policing hypothesis in Los Angeles.  If anything, 
the LAPD has become more aggressive and more effective at combatting crime, 
relative to other municipalities, during the federal intervention era.  Combined, 
these two observations suggest that the real cost of federal intervention was quite 
low.  This realization makes the Los Angeles case study a true success story—a 
case where the law helped to facilitate meaningful improvement in police conduct 
without significant cost.  
 
1. Financial Costs 
 
The consent decree appears to have directly affected the overall budget of the 
LAPD.  Around the time that the LAPD entered into a consent decree with the 
DOJ, the City of Los Angeles spent around $314 (adjusted for inflation) per 
resident on policing services. 110   By 2008, that number ballooned to around 
$374. 111   By the end of the consent decree period, average expenditures per 
resident had receded somewhat—possibly because of the waning implementation 
costs of the consent decree and the nationwide recession that strapped city budgets 
across the nation.112  Initial estimates suggested that the consent decree would cost 
                                                                                                                            
 
108 Id. at 34–38 (stating that initially audits only found 55.5% of arrest packages to be in line 
with policy, but 88% were in line with policy after the monitoring; also noting that compliance rates 
significantly increased for warrants as well).  
109 Id.  
110 Rushin, supra note 41, at 1399. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. (showing in Figure 6 that expenditures per resident over time receded somewhat from 
their peak).  
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around $40 million to implement in the first year, with an additional $30–50 
million a year in expenses in the years to follow.113  
As is the case in many communities facing structural reform litigation, the 
cost of the monitor was particularly controversial.  Towards the end of the consent 
decree monitoring, the then-President of the Police Protective League Tim Sands 
argued publicly that the Kroll was “wast[ing] taxpayer dollars [with] incessant, 
meaningless auditing that does nothing to enhance public safety or ‘reform’ the 
LAPD.”114  Political critics of the consent decree also focused their attacks on the 
high cost of monitoring services.  Council Dennis Zine publicly criticized the cost 
of things like airfare and food paid to monitors who needed to travel from out of 
state to perform their duties.115 
But such short-term complaints about visible and immediate costs likely fail 
to account for the cost savings achieved through improving the constitutionality of 
the LAPD’s behavior.  Admittedly, the initial cost of federal intervention was high.  
Other metrics, though, suggest that the City of Los Angeles was likely able to 
recoup much of this cost.  One way Los Angeles may have recouped these costs is 
through reductions in civil liability.  The LAPD appeared to experience a 
measurable reduction in civil rights and use of force lawsuits resulting in financial 
payouts during the federal intervention era.116  During this time period, the number 
of these types of civil suits against the LAPD appeared to fall by nearly 75 
percent.117  It is easy to imagine other ways that a substantial reduction in police 
misconduct may result in cost savings.  For example, fewer invalid warrant 
applications and more sufficient supporting affidavits could lead to less city 
resources spent on suppression hearings. 
Of course, it may take many years for the LAPD to fully recoup the large, 
upfront costs of federal intervention via reduced litigation costs or other 
consequences of improved police conduct.  Time will tell whether Los Angeles 
will be able to sustain these improvements.  These caveats aside, though, it remains 
theoretically plausible that federal intervention may be a reform that ultimately 
pays for itself financially.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
113 Joseph Giordono & Jason Kandel, Police Union Threatens Suit; LAPD: League President 
Says Officers to File Federal Case About Consent Decree, LONG BEACH PRESS TELEGRAM, Nov. 2, 
2000, at A8.  
114 Rick Orlov, Police Want End to Consent Decree; LAPD: Union Protests Cost of Using 
New York Monitoring Firm, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Feb. 1, 2008, at A3.  
115 Id.  Mr. Zine said, “I don’t know why we had to hire a New York firm to do this work.  
And I don’t know why they couldn’t hire someone in Los Angeles to serve as monitor.”  Id.  
116 Rushin, supra note 41, at 1406–08.  
117 Id. 
 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 14:113 
 
 
132 
2. Did Reform Hurt Police Effectiveness?  
 
Some critics of federal intervention allege that this regulatory mechanism 
causes police departments to become less aggressive, thereby contributing to an 
increase in crime rates.118  According to this view, federal intervention reduces the 
amount of encounters between police and citizenry, either because structural 
reform makes officers hesitant, or because it forces officers to spend valuable time 
completing procedural hurdles.119  Some officers suggest that de-policing is most 
likely to affect the number of police contacts and arrests for minor street crimes.120  
This is because arrests for serious crimes normally happen after lengthy 
investigations, while arrests for minor crimes happen via police officers 
proactively monitoring the streets and responding to visible wrongdoing.  
The de-policing hypothesis suggests that policies and procedures mandated by 
federal intervention inhibit an officer’s abilities to engage in this type of proactive, 
order maintenance policing.  If this de-policing hypothesis were true in Los 
Angeles, the total number of arrests for minor offenses ought to decrease over the 
structural reform era in Los Angeles.  In order to measure whether federal 
intervention impacted the aggressiveness of LAPD officers, this part starts by 
using data on the number of arrests towards the start and end of the structural 
reform era.  Figure 4 shows the change in arrests and stops over the course of 
federal intervention in Los Angeles. 121   
                                                                                                                            
 
118 See, e.g., ROBERT DAVIS, NICOLE HENDERSON & CHRISTOPHER ORTIZ, CAN FEDERAL 
INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING?: THE PITTSBURGH CONSENT 
DECREE 16 (2005) (explaining how officers in Pittsburgh felt “hesitant to intervene in situations 
involving conflict because they were afraid of having a citizen file an unwarranted anonymous 
complaint against them”).  
119 See, e.g., Joshua M. Chanin, Negotiated Justice? The Legal, Administrative, and Policy 
Implications of “Pattern or Practice” Police Misconduct Reform (July 6, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, American University) (quoting a leader from the Washington, D.C. Police Union as 
saying that structural police reform leads to more time-consuming paperwork). 
120 STONE ET AL., supra note 43, at 19–20 (showing in Figure 10 that a high proportion of 
LAPD officers believed that the threat of community complaints would hurt proactive street policing; 
also stating that “concerns have been raised that the consent decree would lead to de-policing or what 
one law enforcement official describe to us as the ‘drive-and-wave syndrome’”). 
121 L.A. POLICE DEP’T, STATISTICAL DIGEST (2001–2011), 
http://www.lapdonline.org/crime_mapping_and_compstat/content_basic_view/9098 (follow 
“statistical digest” hyperlink under the requisite year) (providing the number of serious, or type I, 
arrests, and the number of minor, or type II, arrests for 2001 and 2011 in Los Angeles); BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (UCR): CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2000–2012) [hereinafter FBI UCR STATISTICS], http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-
publications (follow “Crime in the United States” hyperlink under the requisite year; follow “Police 
Employee Data” hyperlink; follow “Table 78” hyperlink; then follow “California” hyperlink).  For 
arrests, I used data from 2001 to represent the start of federal intervention and 2011 to represent the 
end of structural police reform—the most recent date when the LAPD has made thorough data 
publicly available.  For pedestrian and vehicle stops, I used 2002 to represent the start of structural 
police reform since it was the first date that there was good data available.  I used 2008 as the end 
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Figure 4. Annual Arrests and Stops by LAPD 
 
Stage of 
Structural 
Reform 
Total 
Arrests 
Minor 
Arrests 
Minor 
Arrests 
per 
Officer 
Pedestrian 
and Car 
Stops 
Pedestrian 
and Car 
Stops per 
Officer 
Start 139,928 108,005 12.1 587,200 65.7 
End 146,065 123,226 12.5 875,204 88.8 
 
The LAPD executed more arrests towards the end of the structural reform 
than it did at the beginning of the process.  And even when controlling for the size 
of the police force, the number of minor arrests per officer actually increased by 
about 3.3% over the time period.122   Additionally, the number of vehicle and 
pedestrian stops per officer increased from around 65.7 near the start of federal 
intervention to 88.8 near the end—an increase of 35.2%.123  No matter how you 
break it down, LAPD officers appeared to be more aggressive after federal 
intervention than before.  These statistics are even more impressive, considering 
the fact that LAPD officers likely had fewer opportunities to execute arrests at the 
end of federal intervention than at the start.  This is because the total number of 
reported crimes in Los Angeles declined over this time period by 43.8%.124  This 
makes the increase in total arrests and minor arrests even more impressive.  If 
officers do feel more reluctant to engage in proactive street policing, the arrest and 
stop numbers show no evidence of such hesitation.  
The next obvious question is whether federal intervention has correlated with 
any changes in crime outcomes.  Figure 5 compares the change in violent crime 
rates in Los Angeles to the change in violent crime rates in the other largest cities 
over the time period in the United States.125 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
date for motor vehicle and pedestrian stops since it was the most recent date when thorough data was 
easily accessible.  
122 The LAPD had approximately 8,943 sworn police officers in 2001 and 9,860 sworn officers 
in 2011.  Id. 
123 The LAPD had approximately 9,056 sworn police officers in 2002 and 9,743 sworn officers 
in 2008.  Id. 
124 During 2001, the LAPD reported 189,278 total violent crimes and property crimes via 
UCR.  By 2011, this number fell to 106,375.  Id.  
125 FBI UCR STATISTICS, supra note 121 (follow “Crime in the United States” hyperlink under 
the requisite year; follow “Violent Crime” hyperlink; follow “Table 8” hyperlink; then follow the 
hyperlink to the requisite police agency).  Chicago is not included in this sample because it has not 
collected data on rape offenses in a manner that is consistent with the rest of the country.  It is also 
worth noting that during part of this same time period, Detroit was under a § 14141 consent decree as 
well.  Around the end of this time period, New York City was also in the midst of litigation that 
would result in injunctive relief to correct a racially disparate pattern of Terry stops. 
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Figure 5. Changes in Violent Crime Rates from 2000 to 2012 
 
 
 
During the same time that Los Angeles was undergoing federal intervention, 
the city saw a tremendous decrease in violent crime relative to other major 
American cities.  In total, violent crime rates in Los Angeles dipped by 65% 
between 2000 and 2012.126  By comparison, violent crime in the United States fell 
by around 24% during this time period,127 and the median large American city in 
Figure 5 saw violent crime fall by about 28%.128  Figure 6 similarly compares 
changes in property crime in Los Angeles and other large American cities. 129   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
126 Id. (Los Angeles’s violent crime rate dropped from 1,359.8 crimes per 100,000 residents to 
481.1 crimes per 100,000 residents).  
127 The violent crime rate in the United States over the time period started at 506.5 per 100,000 
residents and fell to 386.9 by 2012.  Id. (follow “Crime in the United States” hyperlink under the 
requisite year; follow “Violent Crime” hyperlink; then follow “Table 1” hyperlink). 
128 Using the data from Figure 5, San Diego and San Antonio are jointly the median cities.  
San Diego’s violent crimes fell by 29% and San Antonio’s by 27%, resulting in a median of 28%.  Id. 
129 Id. (follow “Crime in the United States” hyperlink; follow “Property Crime” hyperlink; 
then follow “Table 8” hyperlink).  It is worth noting here that crime rates across the developed world 
have decreased in recent decades.  There is not a complete explanation for this international drop in 
crime rates.  The Curious Case of the Fall in Crime, THE ECONOMIST (July 20, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21582004-crime-plunging-rich-world-keep-it-down-
governments-should-focus-prevention-not.  What makes Los Angeles unique is that it experienced a 
greater crime drop than comparable cities over the same time period.  
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Figure 6. Changes in Property Crime Rates from 2000 to 2012 
 
 
 
Although not as impressive as the violent crime numbers, Los Angeles still 
outperforms the typical large American city during the structural reform era in 
property crime prevention.130  Los Angeles also outperformed the United States as 
a whole.131  Combined, these statistics demonstrate that, at minimum, after the start 
of federal intervention in Los Angeles, the sky is not falling.132  
This essay does not offer a definitive explanation for the dramatic crime 
decline in Los Angeles during the federal intervention era.  In fact, a recent 
empirical examination shows that the Los Angeles experience may be unusual.  On 
                                                                                                                            
 
130 The median city—San Diego—saw a decline of 26% in property crime.  Los Angeles saw a 
decline of 36% in property crime.  FBI UCR STATISTICS, supra note 121. 
131 The United States saw property crime decline from a rate of 3,618.3 in 2000 to a rate of 
2,859.2 in 2012, an overall drop of about 21% (significantly lower than Los Angeles at 36%).  Id. 
(follow “Crime in the United States” hyperlink under the requisite year; follow “Property Crime” 
hyperlink; then follow “Table 1” hyperlink). 
132 Of course, it is not immediately clear whether the LAPD had an effect on these changes in 
crime outcomes.  Criminologists have theorized that a number of demographic, legal, and socio-
economic factors may affect crime rates.  Historically, criminologists explained the causes of crime 
in four ways.  Classical criminologists generally argued that individuals are rational actors; thus, in 
order to deter crime, policymakers ought to raise the costs of crime through increasing the length or 
certainty of criminal penalties.  See generally CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND 
OTHER WRITINGS (Richard Bellamy ed., 1995); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).  
Sociological criminologists contend that society defines and creates crime through poverty, income 
inequality, and culture.  JOHN LEA & JOCK YOUNG, Relative Deprivation, in WHAT IS TO BE DONE 
ABOUT LAW AND ORDER (1984); LAMBERT A. J. QUETELET, Of the Development of the Propensity to 
Crime, in A TREATISE ON MAN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS FACULTIES (Edinburgh, William & 
Robert Chambers 1842).  And situational criminologists have argued that society can deter criminal 
deviance by adjusting situational incentives for illegal behavior.  Ronald V.G. Clarke, “Situational” 
Crime Prevention: Theory and Practice, 20 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 136 (1980); Marcus Felson, The 
Routine Activity Approach as a General Crime Theory, in OF CRIME & CRIMINALITY 205 (Sally S. 
Thompson ed., 2000).  Any of these factors may partially explain the unusually large decrease in 
crime in Los Angeles during the structural reform litigation era.  
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average, police departments undergoing federal intervention have seen increases in 
some reported crime categories compared to unaffected municipalities—
particularly in the first few years immediately after the initiation of federal 
intervention.133  Instead, this essay offers a narrower, but nonetheless important 
claim.  The LAPD case study demonstrates that constitutional policing in Los 
Angeles did not necessarily come at the price of crime control.  In fact, Los 
Angeles was able to introduce significant constitutional reforms that curbed 
apparent police misconduct while also undergoing one of the largest crime drops in 
American history.  
 
III. ALAMANCE COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT 
 
While the LAPD may represent a best case scenario for § 14141 intervention, 
the Alamance County Sheriff’s Department (ACSD) demonstrates some emerging 
limitations of this regulatory mechanism.  For years, the DOJ appeared to manage 
its enforcement of § 14141.  During this time, the DOJ has successfully negotiated 
settlements with jurisdictions and avoided costly litigation.  This approach worked 
fairly well, as the DOJ was able to leverage the structure of local government to 
obtain favorable settlements with targeted municipalities.  While some police 
chiefs have resisted DOJ-initiated reform, the DOJ typically has found a more 
receptive audience in the municipality’s mayor, city council, city attorney, or city 
manager.  Generally, city government officials have been more receptive to 
negotiation with the DOJ if they perceive that a settlement can reduce costs and 
avoid lengthy litigation.  For this reason, the DOJ has been able to reach amicable 
settlements with most cities targeted under § 14141. 134   That changed with 
Alamance County, North Carolina.135  
In the years leading up to the DOJ suit against Alamance County, “civil rights 
advocates in Alamance County . . . accused [Alamance County Sheriff Terry] 
Johnson of targeting Latino residents in an effort to spur deportations.”136  One 
                                                                                                                            
 
133 Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017). 
134 Rushin, supra note 41, at 1373.  
135 It is worth noting that the Department of Justice is appealing its loss to Alamance County at 
the trial level.  See Anna Johnson, Despite DOJ Appeal, Alamance Sheriff’s Office Once Again 
Eligible for State, Federal Grants, TIMES-NEWS (Oct. 29, 2015), 
http://www.thetimesnews.com/article/20151029/NEWS/151028706 (explaining that the DOJ is 
appealing its loss to Alamance County).  The Department of Justice was able to defeat Colorado City 
in a similar trial.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Wins Religious 
Discrimination Lawsuit Against Colorado City, Arizona, and Hildale, Utah (Mar. 7, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-wins-religious-discrimination-lawsuit-against-
colorado-city-arizona-and.  
136 Billy Ball, The Department of Justice Lays out its Case Against the Alamance County 
Sheriff, INDY WEEK (Aug. 20 2014), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/the-department-of-justice-
lays-out-its-case-against-the-alamance-county-sheriff/Content?oid=4229013. 
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local newspaper reporter described Sheriff Johnson as “a white Southern sheriff 
prone to saying things every so often a white Southern sheriff shouldn’t say.”137  
The DOJ filed suit against Sheriff Johnson and the Alamance County Sheriff’s 
Department in 2012 after a multiyear long investigation revealed an apparent 
pattern and practice of “systematic racial profiling of Latinos.”138  Sheriff Terry 
Johnson was hostile to DOJ intervention from the very beginning.  The complaint 
against Sheriff Johnson also alleged that he withheld documents and falsified 
records.139 
Among the more inflammatory accusations in the DOJ’s findings letter was a 
claim that Sheriff Johnson ordered his officers: “Go out there and catch me some 
Mexicans,” and “Go out there and get some of those taco eaters.”140  The DOJ 
cited examples of apparent racial bias within the leadership structure in Alamance 
County, like a time when an Alamance County Sheriff’s Office captain sent “his 
subordinates a video game premised on shooting Mexican children, pregnant 
women, and other ‘wetbacks.’”141 
Prominent civil rights organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union 
took an interest in the Alamance County case, urging Sheriff Johnson to comply 
with DOJ requests.142  But “[t]he Alamance County commissioners, all white,” 
strongly supported Sheriff Johnson’s resistance to federal intervention, “praising 
his hard-line stance against illegal immigration.” 143   And in the midst of the 
dispute, Governor Pat McCrory honored Sheriff Johnson with the Order of the 
Long Leaf Pine award, one of North Carolina’s top civilian honors.144  
                                                                                                                            
 
137 David Zucchino, North Carolina Town Split over Sheriff’s Treatment of Latinos, L.A. 
TIMES (Nov. 23, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/23/nation/la-na-sheriff-20121124. 
138 Michael Biesecker, US Files Civil Rights Complaint Against NC Sheriff, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Dec. 20, 2012; Emery P. Dalesio, Attorney: NC Sheriff Won’t Settle Profiling Claims, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 26, 2012 (stating that the DOJ’s investigation of the Alamance County 
Sheriff’s Department lasted two years). 
139 Biesecker, supra note 138.  
140 Billy Ball, Feds sue Alamance Sheriff for Alleged Racial Profiling of Latinos, INDY WEEK 
(Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/feds-sue-alamance-sheriff-for-alleged-racial-
profiling-of-latinos/Content?oid=3232247. 
141 Justice Department Documents Discriminatory Practices by Alamance Sheriff’s Office in 
Latest Court Filing, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/news/justice-
department-documents-discriminatory-practices-alamance-sheriffs-office-latest-court.  This alleged 
behavior happened at a time when the Alamance County demographics were changing.  In 1990, 
Alamance County had only 736 Latinos.  Today, the County is home to approximately 17,000 
Latinos, with whites now making up only 66% of the County population.  Zucchino, supra note 137. 
142  Zucchino, supra note 137. 
143 Id. 
144 Colin Campbell, McCrory Honors Alamance County Sheriff Facing Federal Allegations of 
Racial Profiling, NEWS & OBSERVER (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-
government/politics-columns-blogs/under-the-dome/article10198235.html.  It is worth noting that 
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So when the “Justice Department invited the Sheriff’s Office to negotiate a 
court enforceable agreement to remedy the violations[,] [t]he Sheriff’s Office 
declined the offer.”145  Instead, the DOJ and Alamance County began the first § 
14141 trial since the statutes passage in 1994.  The trial itself only lasted for a few 
days in August of 2014.146  But U.S. District Judge Thomas D. Schroeder took 
nearly a year to issue his opinion in the case.147  When he eventually released his 
opinion, Judge Schroeder concluded that the DOJ had failed to demonstrate a 
pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct. 148   In a detailed 253-page 
opinion, Judge Schroeder found “no evidence that any individual was 
unconstitutionally deprived of his or her rights under the Fourth or Fourteenth 
Amendments,” and argued that “the Government’s case rested largely on vague, 
isolated statements attributed to Sheriff Johnson and on statistical analyses.”149   
Judge Schroeder did recognize that the Alamance County Sheriff’s 
Department had some problems.  The department was inconsistent in its use of 
discipline against officers engaged in misconduct.150   Judge Schroeder harshly 
criticized officers for their “abhorrent” decisions to circulate racist emails and their 
use of epithets and slurs.151  Nevertheless, he concluded that the government still 
presented insufficient evidence to prove that any of these actions resulted in a 
pattern or practice of unconstitutional behavior by frontline officers.152  And Judge 
Schroeder rejected statistical evidence presented by DOJ experts that purported to 
show a pattern of discriminatory policing.153  In its first real showdown with a 
defiant police department under § 14141, the DOJ lost.  In the process, the DOJ 
                                                                                                                            
Government Pat McCrory claimed that the award was unrelated to the ongoing federal suit against 
Sheriff Johnson and this was the second time that Sheriff Johnson received this sort of an honor.  Id.  
145 Cost of Alamance Sheriff Terry Johnson’s Trial Continues to Grow, GREENSBORO NEWS & 
RECORD (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.greensboro.com/news/cost-of-alamance-sheriff-terry-johnson-
s-trial-continues-to/article_1a68694a-2d16-11e4-a78a-001a4bcf6878.html.  
146 Michael D. Abernethy, Judge Dismisses DOJ Case Against Johnson, Finds No Evidence of 
Unconstitutional Practices, TIMES-NEWS (Aug. 7, 2015), 
http://www.thetimesnews.com/article/20150807/NEWS/150809283/?Start=1. 
147 Id. (“Five days shy of a year since the case was tried, a federal judge Friday found 
for Alamance County Sheriff Terry Johnson and ruled that the U.S. Department of Justice failed to 
show a pattern or practice of racial profiling against Latinos.”).  
148 Id.  
149 Id.  
150 Id. (“The evidence at trial highlighted inconsistencies in ACSO’s discipline.  Some conduct 
violating ACSO’s policies was disciplined, while other conduct was not.  A competent, efficient, and 
professional functioning law enforcement organization requires consistent, regular discipline.”).  
151 Id. (“He admonished officers who circulated racist emails and jokes, and said epithets and 
slurs used by some officers were ‘abhorrent.’”).  
152 Id.  
153 Id. (explaining that the judge “found as matters of fact that the statistical analyses proffered 
by the DOJ were unpersuasive and in instances scientifically unsound”). 
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may have severely crippled its future of § 14141 as a mechanism to promote 
cooperative reform in local police departments.  
Before the Alamance County case, police departments facing § 14141 
litigation likely were hesitant to go to trial in part because they were not certain 
what legal standard courts would use in interpreting a so-called “pattern or 
practice” of misconduct.  If the Alamance County case is any indication, some 
municipalities may have underestimated their chances of success against the DOJ 
in a § 14141 trial.154 
Perhaps most unsettling about the Alamance County case, though, are the 
allegations by one deputy in the Alamance office about how Sheriff Johnson 
responded to dissent within his ranks during and after the DOJ inquiry.  One of 
Sheriff Johnson’s deputies—Jeffrey Randleman—testified on behalf of the DOJ, 
claiming that Sheriff Johnson had asked him to check the immigration status of 
people not yet in custody.155  Deputy Randleman had been working at the sheriff’s 
department in Alamance County for twenty-two years under numerous different 
sheriffs.156  But soon after testifying on behalf of the DOJ, Sheriff Johnson chose 
“not to re-swear Randleman as an [sic] deputy, effectively firing him.”157  This 
apparent firing stood in stark contrast to how Sheriff Johnson treated other officers 
after the lawsuit.  Even though the DOJ lawsuit uncovered undisputed incidents of 
some of the sheriff’s department’s “highest-ranking supervisors” circulating highly 
offensive jokes based on ethnic stereotypes, there has been no evidence that Sheriff 
Johnson reprimanded or fired any of these employees. 158   Instead, Randleman 
appears to be “the sole deputy dismissed.”159  When questioned about the firing, 
Johnson argued that “North Carolina deputies serve at the pleasure of the Sheriff 
and have no property right in their job[s].”160  Such a firing raises a difficult 
                                                                                                                            
 
154 It is worth acknowledging that at some point, it is likely that the DOJ may bring a § 14141 
suit that it deserves to lose.  No administrative agency will be perfect, even if resource constraints 
force the DOJ to only take on what they view as the most egregious cases.  This essay takes no 
position on whether the DOJ provided sufficient evidence to prove that Alamance County is engaged 
in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct.  Instead, this essay merely uses the Alamance 
County Sheriff’s Department as an example of a case where the DOJ failed to achieve an amicable 
resolution. 
155 Kenwyn Caranna, Update: Former Alamance Deputy Sues Sheriff Terry Johnson over 
Firing, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.greensboro.com/news/update-
former-alamance-deputy-sues-sheriff-terry-johnson-over-firing/article_8d858f2c-b78e-11e4-961f-
330273b86bfd.html. 
156 Id.  
157 Id.  
158 Officers Never Reprimanded for Inappropriate Emails, Racial Slurs, GREENSBORO NEWS & 
RECORD (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.greensboro.com/news/officers-never-reprimanded-for-
inappropriate-emails-racial-slurs/article_a71c81dc-2591-11e4-a237-0017a43b2370.html. 
159 Caranna, supra note 155.  
160 Id.  
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question under North Carolina law: whether political conformity with the sheriff is 
a permissible job requirement in sheriffs’ departments.161  And if so, what is to 
keep sheriffs from creating an organization that openly punishes cooperation with 
federal civil rights investigations under the guise of political patronage? 
The Alamance County example raises several unanswered questions: What 
evidence must the DOJ provide in order to prove the existence of a “pattern or 
practice” of unconstitutional misconduct at trial?  Will Alamance County’s 
successful trial against the DOJ embolden more police departments to resist federal 
intervention under § 14141?  And perhaps most importantly, what happens if the 
DOJ wins its next trial against a police agency like the ACSD?  Will the DOJ be 
successful in overhauling such a problematic agency without organizational buy-
in?  
  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Two lessons emerge from this tale of two cities.  The first lesson is that, under 
the right conditions, federal intervention appears to be an effective tool in 
facilitating organizational reform.  Even after the Rodney King and Rampart 
Scandal, the LAPD seemed unwilling to dedicate significant amounts of money to 
the cause of police misconduct reform.162  Federal intervention forced Los Angeles 
to make a concerted investment into police reform.  The use of external monitoring 
led to extensive data on frontline officer behavior in the LAPD.  It also led to 
improvements in how the LAPD internally audited and responded to officer 
behavior.  The initiation of federal intervention also correlated with a change in 
leadership atop the LAPD.  Chief Bratton’s support for federal intervention may 
have contributed to the measure’s success in Los Angeles.  And the LAPD was 
able to make substantial improvements in the quality of its police force without 
significantly impairing the quality of police services.  The evidence does not 
suggest that federal intervention in Los Angeles correlated with any reductions in 
police efficiency or effectiveness.  Instead, the evidence suggests that Los Angeles 
improved the constitutionality of its police force with little compromise.  This 
particular case study is encouraging.163  
                                                                                                                            
 
161 Michael Patrick Burke, Comment, Political Patronage and North Carolina Law: Is 
Political Conformity with the Sheriff a Permissible Job Requirement for Deputies?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
1743 (2001).  
162 Editorial, The Lame Duck Truth; Mayor Riordan’s Final Budget Speaks to the Sad State of 
the LAPD, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Apr. 23, 2001, at N12 (showing that the LAPD did not see an 
increase in funding to support the reforms deemed necessary after the Rodney King incident).  
163 It is worth noting, however, that a recent empirical examination shows that the Los Angeles 
experience may be unusual.  On average, police departments undergoing federal intervention have 
seen crime increase somewhat compared to unaffected municipalities.  Rushin & Edwards, supra 
note 133. 
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The second lesson from this essay is less encouraging.  Federal intervention 
initiated by the DOJ may be most effective in agencies like Los Angeles that are 
generally supportive of external intervention.  In some cases, the police agencies 
most in need of the DOJ’s assistance—like, arguably, Alamance County—may be 
the least supportive of federal intervention.  This is a particularly dispiriting 
realization.  Section 14141 reform is a powerful tool for facilitating organizational 
change in some police departments.  But it remains unclear whether the DOJ can 
use this mechanism to overhaul a police department that vehemently opposes 
federal intervention.  
